This paper challenges the UN Security Council's approach to women, peace and security through a detailed analysis of participation initiatives in the eight resolutions on women, peace and security, alongside study of the recent shift to include countering terrorism and violent extremism provisions in resolution 2242. Through review of a range of feminist approaches that remain 'outside' the strategies leading institutional gender perspectives I scrutinise the shifts across the resolutions on women, peace and security. In particular, this article analyses how Security Council resolution 2242, produced after the High-Level Report studying the fifteen years after resolution 1325, includes important developments in the articulation of participation. However, the risk of progressing work on women, peace and security within global structures without attention to the diversity of women's needs, lives and experiences drawn from a feminist commitment to anti-militarism and postcolonial listening is likely to produce a series of regressive outcomes that perpetuate victim feminisms and which fail to dislodge the intersection of gender with colonial and racial power structures within global institutions.
framing of women's participation, new implementation initiatives and the use of the women, peace and security framework in co-ordination with the counter-terrorism agenda. Despite these additions, the silence on the Security Council's expanding authorisations of military force and the complicity of United Nations peacekeeping operations in sexual exploitation and abuse raises questions about the women, peace and security framework as a whole. In addition, the linkage of the women, peace and security agenda with the countering terrorism and violent extremism underlines the reality that the Security Council cannot and does not function as a space of feminist law making.
In examining the manner in which the Security Council develops provisions on participation I develop a critique of the dominance of liberal and radical feminist accounts that are prominent in the women, peace and security framework calling, instead, for attention to the manner in which women's difference is constituted, how gender is implicated in broader power relationships and the sustained intersectional privileges produced within international institutional outputs. Unlike much scholarship on women, peace and security, I focus less on Security Council resolution 1325 (31 October 2000) and take all eight resolutions as the focus for my analysis. This is in part driven by a desire to disrupt the dominant focus on either Security Council resolution 1325 exclusively or a focus on the four resolutions that address issues related to conflict related sexual violence without sufficient discussion of the relevance of the various approaches across all eight resolutions. As the Security Council has now issued eight resolutions on women, peace and security (four on conflict related sexual violence and four on broader issues under the women, peace and security framework) I regard the themes and developments, advances and limitations across the spectrum of resolutions as important.
In reviewing Security Council resolution 2242 as an element of the larger women, peace and security framework I conclude that 2242 marks a change in terms of how the Security Council articulates requirements with respect to participation and this reflects the sustained, critical and informed feminist and gender work that is undertaken via the umbrella organisation of UN Women. Nevertheless, the institutional demands on the women, peace and security frameworkdriven by wider security approaches of the Security Council and its permanent members -continues to raise concerns about the long-term effectiveness of utilising the Security Council as a space for developing and implementing gender law reform.
The article proceeds in the following manner. I begin with a review of how participation is articulated in Security Council resolutions 1325 through to 2122 and the feminist approaches drafting process, the resolution is broad in its articulation of the interlinking concerns across the four pillars and demonstrates a commitment on the part of the Security Council to underscoring the nexus between women, peace and security in its wider work. In this section I focus on the participation pillar only, and compare the manner in which participation is articulated in Security Council resolution 1325 and the subsequent six resolutions (Resolutions 1820 (Resolutions , 1888 (Resolutions , 1889 (Resolutions , 1960 (Resolutions , 2106 (Resolutions and 2122 . This allows me to focus on resolution 2242 in the following section and address the trajectory of concerns in the Council's approach to participation. I argue that it is in the participation pillar that the slow advance of gender law reform can be seen.
The participation pillar in Security Council resolution 1325 is articulated in the first operative paragraph of the text, signally the overarching value and importance that increased representation of women at all levels of decision-making held for WILPF actors involved in drafting the resolution. As such, the opening paragraph of the resolution requires the increased participation of women in all decision-makingnational, regional and international and across security issues 'for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict '. 7 This is supplemented by a request to the Secretary-General to increase women's contributions to decision-making bodies in the United Nations, including as Special Representatives and envoys. 8 In paragraph four the Security Council calls for an expansion of the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-missions, while throughout the resolution a commitment to incorporating gender perspectives and gender mainstreaming is articulated alongside the Security Council expressing its willingness, in paragraph 15, to develop consultations with local and international women's groups.
Despite the range of initiatives within Security Council resolution 1325 that attended to the participation pillar of the women, peace and security framework it is paragraph one that is of (potentially) the greatest value, as this paragraph is directed at member states and instructs member states to develop these components of the resolution. Security Council resolution 1325 specifically directs member states to act under paragraph one, calls on all parties to peace negotiations under paragraph seven, all parties to armed conflicts under paragraphs eight through to thirteen and otherwise addresses the Secretary-General or the Council itself.
None of these provisions are drafted using mandatory language and thus remain soft (nonbinding) law provisions. This is important as creates aspirational goals for member states, and other actors, with respect to women's participation in all stages of conflict prevention and resolution. This remains the case for the seven subsequent resolutions. Nevertheless, the distinction between paragraph one, and the subsequent paragraphs in Security Council resolution 1325 that address participation, is found in the directive for states to act: as states remain the primary subjects under international law and, if the Security Council, were to exercise its law-making powers this would be through the imposition of legal obligations on states. In this sense paragraph one of the resolution is of specific importance from a lawmaking perspective and to this end the feminist approach that it embeds within the Security Council's approach to women, peace and security should be regarded as of significant importance.
Paragraph one of Security Council resolution 1325 focuses on increasing numbers/
representation of women at all levels (national, regional, international) signalling a liberal feminist approach of counting the women or, what might be referred to as, representative participation. Liberal feminist approaches identify and pursue formal equality goals, through embracing rights and equality measures within gender law reform. Although liberal feminisms have been relatively successful in ensuring gender equality within liberal legal frameworks, they have been criticised for failing to challenge the masculine framing of law and ignoring substantive inequality. It is paragraph one of resolution 1325, and its liberal framing of women's participation, that is also reiterated in future resolutions, including in resolution 2242. Other studies have documented the small quantitative change that has resulted from these participation components. 9 In addition to only very small changes in the number of women participating being documented over the life of resolution 1325, the focus of this provision, and the requirement for greater inclusion of women in formal decision making bodies, ultimately maintains a formal equality strategy that is largely aligned with the liberal feminist goal of increasing the numbers of women in decision making bodies. This might in and of itself be a valuable thing; however, this remains a very narrow feminist project that does not sufficiently account for women's diversity or the types of factors that make political participation possible for some women and not others. Liberal feminist projects centre on the promotion of a liberal equality model that imagine the liberal subject as unencumbered and plays down the role of institutional and structural disadvantages. As a consequence, the promotion of representation of women without reflection on additional privileges that facilitate access to decision-making bodies represents a specific feminist agenda. Further work is required to avoid the reliance on the participation of elite women in international institutions; who often represent the same or similar groups as men who have access to decision making bodies. At an epistemological level, liberal feminist projects work from assumptions with regard to women's sameness (within groups of women and with men) and ultimately re-inscribe problematic gender binaries.
Recognition of the promotion of a liberal feminist framework centred on increased representation highlights two underlying concerns that need to be broached when addressing women's participation and inclusion within peace and security decision-making bodies. First, attention needs to be paid to how the diversity of feminist approaches can be accommodated within international institutions, if at all. Second, approaches need to develop sensitivity to the diversity of women, women's needs and women's experiences and to consider what possibilities exist for this to be reflected within international legal reforms. In the words of Gunaratnam and Hamilton, 'a commitment to make feminism mean something . . . has continued to complicate and supplement the idea of a distinct feminist methodological imperative'. 10 Liberal feminist approaches can thus be read as one approach amongst many, rather than the approach of feminism. For the purposes of this paper, attention to peripheral subjects, 11 coloniality, 12 and embodied subjectivity 13 provide feminist theorising that seeks to address the assumed uniform feminist project within international spaces. In identifying peripheral subjects and positioning the views of those on the periphery as normatively equal in their assertion of needs and rights, Western feminist projects -such as liberal feminismare challenged to re-consider and reflect on the biases and privilege that their positions on women, peace and security stem from. At the same time this begins from the lived experiences of those who feel the negative impact, or have felt the impact, of past international policies: on peace and security, on development and via international institutions. This also requires the Security Council to be attentive to which feminist and gender voices are permitted to speak within international institutions. In response to the second concern, I propose a project of identifying the over-representation of men in institutional structures as a relevant and important starting point. This second strategy requires the women, peace and security framework to shift from the collapsing of the term gender to mean women, toward recognising men and women's diverse, lived experiences and to theorise how gender is a power relationship that interlocks with other sites of privilege to create disadvantage, under representation and misrecognition of existing contributions. In particular, the answer to the second question (on women's diversity) lies less in seeing gender as a site of identity (male or female, man or women) and rather as produced by institutional assumptions and frameworks that prioritise and reinforce a gendered normative order that both empowers and disempowers. In doing so a space that opens toward appreciating personhood might also be envisaged.
Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1960 and 2106
In addition to Security Council resolution 1325, women's participation is addressed across the four resolutions on conflict related sexual violence. The resolutions -1820, 1888, 1960 and 2106represent the specific attention of the UK and US representatives in the Security Council who have taken the lead on resolutions and initiatives within the Security Council on matters with respect to conflict related sexual violence. Across these resolutions references to women's participation are consistently circumscribed as necessary either to protect women from conflict related sexual violence or to add preventative measures. For example, Security Council resolution 1820 (19 th June 2008) calls for, in paragraph eight, 'wherever possible the deployment of a higher percentage of women peacekeepers and police' as a preventative measure against the perpetration of conflict related sexual violence; in paragraph ten calls for consultation with women and women-led organisations to develop protection measures; and, in paragraph eleven, for consultations with women's civil society groups during peace processes to find ways to address conflict related sexual violence. 14 The sum of the conflict related sexual violence resolutions is to reduce the 1325 model of participation to women's participation in peace and security matters as one driven by a need to address conflict related sexual violence. This is an unfortunate reduction of women's participation to one that might be described as a protective participation model. 18 The underlying feminist model, if any, 19 that this might be described as derived from is that of US forms of radical feminism: where women's sexual vulnerability and subordination is regarded as the central site of women's disempowerment and discrimination. 20 Not only has this feminist approach been criticised as a developing a form of victim feminism within the international order 21 and exporting a limited feminist model into the global order, 22 the approach places conflict related sexual violence as the paradigmatic experience of women during armed conflict and may deflect attention from economic needs, 23 gender-based violence and the role of gendered power relations in producing the myriad of gendered harms that communities experience. The approach also centres on an assumption that men outside of Western /powerful states are the primary perpetrators of sexual violence, while deflecting attention from the inadequacies of laws in peacetime states in prosecuting, preventing or creating protection from sexual violence.
While sexual exploitation and abuse committed by UN personal is also addressed within these resolutions the following two assumptions are also carried through the four resolutions.
First, that sexual exploitation and abuse is the irregular and exceptional behaviour of individual peacekeeping personal. Second, increased participation of women in peacekeeping operations is a means to reduce sexual exploitation and abuse. Combined these two assumptions appear to deny the role of military sexual cultures in the permissive approach peacekeeping communities have to sexual relations while on mission and place a double burden of female peacekeepers to undertake their professional roles and to police their male colleagues.
Resolutions 1889 and 2122
The two additional Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security, resolution 1889 (5 th October 2009) 24 and resolution 2122 (18 th October 2013), 25 add a model of substantive participation within the women, peace and security framework. Resolution 1889 reiterates the call of 1325 for increased formal representation of women at all levels of decision-making in relation to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding but also, and significantly, acknowledges the substantive factors that hinder women's access to participation and representation. Unfortunately, the key influence of Security Council resolution 1889 has been the shift to the use of indicators in United Nations missions as a mechanism to 'measure' the success of the women, peace and security framework. The use of indicators, which are never in and of themselves neutral or objective tools, 26 risks a collapse into a project of counting the women rather than attention to the substantive and structural disadvantages that hinder women's full participation within any community. In addition, resolution 1889 does not acknowledge the needs of diverse groups of women and how representation of some women within decision-making bodies will not necessarily address the needs of different women, in particular indigenous women, socially and economically disadvantaged women, women with health disadvantages and women within racial and ethnic minorities. Beyond this it is worth also noting that the resolutions as a whole more often emphasise the need for consultation with women's groups, women's civil society and women's organisations rather than promoting women as decision makers or as members of decision-making groups. Although this is included in a somewhat minimal fashion, it is important to note that the language of consulting diverse groups of women's groups to reflect the views of socially and economically disadvantaged women is of considerable importance and presents an opening for women who feel unrepresented within international security discourse to mobilise around.
Given the history of Security Council resolution 1325 as primarily functioning as a tool which local women's groups use to challenge and speak to national governments it might be expected that the incorporation and recognition that different women will have different needs in post-conflict communities will be mobilised strategically by women's organisations in the future. Second, resolution 2122 indicates the Security Council itself as a site where gendered assumptions need to be challenged. In paragraph 15, resolution 2122 calls for an 'implementation shift' in the Council's work. Again, this is only a small part of a resolution that otherwise reiterates many of the provisions seen in earlier resolutions and, yet, also implicitly acknowledges a problem with the Security Council imposing gender perspectives on post-conflict communities and not reflecting on the gendered contours of its own work.
Indeed, the paragraph 15 joins paragraph 7(a) of Security Council resolution 2122 as a potential challenge to gender essentialism that assumes problematic gender norms as elsewhere or to be received by poor, disadvantaged and conflict societies and not a component of international and/ or powerful states structures.
Despite these two significant developments within resolution 2122, like the six resolutions before, 2122 does continue to address gender through a focus on women that assumes men as the existing participants and as a unitary group, denying the exclusion of some men and denying the over representation of men in decision-making structures as a significant problem. This happens in two ways. First, all of the resolutions speak about gender perspectives, gender equality, gender mainstreaming and gender balance and yet when this is translated to strategies for action the focus is on increasing the numbers of women. Not only are the diversity of women's needs and experiences eradicated from the resolutions but women's existing contributions to peace and securitylocally, regionally and internationally are rendered as doubly invisible and unimportant often because they are located outside of formal decision-making arenas. The gendered division of labour that is present in peace and security work, just as in other industries and spaces of work and expertise, is reinforced rather than challenged by this approach. That is, women's existing work on security is rendered as peace work or relegated to informal spaces which are not recognised as working alongside and in partnership with formal decision making institutions. The long history of women's mobilisation for peace across conflict spaces is not acknowledged as security work or as a form of participation in manner that is deeply gendered in terms of the types of work and participation that are acknowledged as mattering. Second, men's over representation on decision-making bodies is never articulated as the actual problem, when this happens the diversity of men's experience is also rendered invisible and the intersection of gender and other vectors of power that sustains privilege remains unexamined.
In sum, the first seven resolutions on women, peace and security present a kaleidoscope view Before drawing conclusions about the approach to women, peace and security, the following section takes a detailed look at the provisions developed and incorporated into the eighth resolution on women, peace and security, resolution 2242. In doing so I review how the above models are continued and transformed, with specific attention to the continual risks of using the Security Council as a space for pursuing women's rights and feminist agendas. I also reflect on the complicity of the Security Council in militarisation over peace projects, so as to consider whether a turn to the participation requirements of the framework further demonstrates the co-optation of feminist projects within the global order. Finally, I address the recurrent civilisation tropes that play out in the structuring of whose contributions matter and in terms of what forms women's participation is envisaged taking. Ultimately, I argue the risks of co-optation raise outweigh the possible gains but that the existing resolutions might still be used by feminist actors via strategic misreadings and focus on the key advances in resolution 2242, in particular.
Security Council Resolution 2242
Security Council resolution, issued October 13 th 2015, was drafted as a response to the High Level review of resolution 1325 undertaken by Radhika Coomaraswamy. 27 The High Level Report sought to take stock of the gains and achievements of the fifteen years after resolution 1325 to produce a forward looking eighth resolution on women, peace and security. Security considerable hope in terms of the continued refinement of the existing women, peace and security agenda.
Resolution 2242 and participation
The key transformations to the women, peace and security framework within Security Council resolution 2242 can be summarised as follows. In paragraph 5(b), the resolution requires that all country-specific agendas take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultations with local women's groups (emphasis added). The requirement, in paragraph 7, that gender analysis and technical expertise is included in all stages of peacekeeping missions, mandates, implementation, review and drawdownincluding the doubling of the numbers of women in peacekeeping operations. In paragraphs 11 and 12, the resolution calls for the integration of the women, peace and security agenda into counter-terrorism strategies. In addition, the language that resolution 2242 appears to be sensitive to the language of women's rightssomething that has only been a peripheral concern of prior resolutions.
Importantly for this analysis, the language of women's participation and consultation in resolution 2242 is untied from additional 'women's issues', such that the resolution articulates women's increased participation as a self-evident requirement: that need not be justified due to any specific experience of women. While this is a small change it is important that women's participation is regarded as a self-evident claim that need not be justified by claims to greater effectiveness of decision-making bodies, the different skills women are supposed to add to decision-making bodies or the expectation that women's issues can only be addressed if women are participants. Consequently, similar to Security Council resolution 2122, the 2015 resolution considerably expands features of earlier resolutions even in the paragraphs that reiterate earlier paragraphs. For example, paragraph one, which starts with the language of previous resolutions, including resolution 1325, calling for the expansion of the representation of women in all levels of decision-making, goes further through recognising the need for resourcing from member states to support training for women and to develop women's 'meaningful inclusion in negotiating party's delegations to peace talks'.
This develops the requirement of participation to State investment in women's training and the creation of processes to ensure this is transformative and accessible. Paragraph one of resolution 2242 also identifies the need for meaningful participation of civil society at regional and international levels, potentially picking up on the gaps in application of the original paragraph one in resolution 1325 where outcomes have been largely based within national spaces. Finally, paragraph one concludes by identifying the need for 'facilitating cross representation of civil society representatives', suggesting that, as with resolution 2122 before it, the Security Council's approach has begun to appreciate and incorporate attention to the diversity of women's needs and experiences, and possibly the diversity of gendered experiences given that paragraph one speaks of civil society rather than women's organisations / groups. Again, while this might seem to be a minor adjustment in the language deployed by the Security Council for women who have found their differences eradicated by the failure to address difference in the women, peace and security framework this is a change in language that women's groups should instrumentalise and ensure to use in their interactions with state actors and institutions.
Additional differences within this resolution are found in paragraph seven which requires 'women's needs and gender perspectives' to inform all aspects of peacekeeping operations. This subtle language shift where 'women's needs' are required to be understood rather than woman as being consulted and is quite important, as it signals the potential for diverse women's needs to be considered and for diverse voices to represent women's needs. In addition, the term gender perspectives in this paragraphalthough never defined by the international communityis closer to an acknowledgement of feminist approaches as being relevant. That is, gender perspectives might be articulated regardless of the representation of gender by any individual or group of individuals, allowing a shift toward understanding gender as a normative ordering rather than a description of men and women.
In paragraph eight the Security Council articulates a commitment to appointment of women in senior UN posts, including with cross-geographical representation, again marking a significant shift in the Security Council's perception of participation as this identifies the UN as also functioning to reproduce a gendered space of expertise that requires specific and conscious interventions to disrupt and transform. The inclusion of a requirement of crossregional representation, while not recognising women's diversity within communities let alone within regions, is also an improvement on the earlier, formal equality agenda of the women, peace and security framework.
Finally, in paragraph five, the Security Council further develops the implementation shift articulated in resolution 2122 and reflects inward on Council processes so as to 'recognize the need for greater integration of resolution 1325 in its own work'. However, the Security Council then extends this to include the need for consultation processes and all situations on the Security Council agenda should 'take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultations with local and international women's groups'. 28 This is a significant development beyond the representative participation articulated within resolution 1325, the protective participation model found in the resolutions on conflict related violence and the modest move toward substantive participation in resolution 1889 or 2122.
In terms of protective protection, predominantly articulated in the conflict related sexual violence resolutions, this approach is not found in Security Council resolution 2242. Instead, in paragraph eight the resolution calls for a doubling of the number of women in peacekeeping operations while separately, in paragraphs nine and ten, calls for stronger mechanisms to investigate sexual exploitation and abuse, enhance pre-deployment training and peacekeeper accountability. The separation of these two agendas, although placed consecutively within the resolution, indicates an important step away from the protective participation of the earlier resolutions. Additionally, paragraph 14 adds a need for the strengthening of access to justice for women in post conflict communities with a specific requirement that this be established in relation to challenging impunity for conflict related sexual violence and, importantly, gender-based violence. Again, this considerably broadens the scope of the women, peace and security framework through recognition of the importance of access to justice and the framing of sexual violence as a subset of gender-based violence.
Resolution 2242 and Countering Terrorism
Despite the advances with regard to how participation is articulated in resolution 2242, this appears to come at a significant cost. In paragraphs 11 through to 13 the women, peace and security framework is linked to the Security Council's approach to counter-terrorism. Ní Aoláin provides an analysis of the convergence of the two collective security projectswomen, peace and security and countering terrorism and violent extremismto conclude:
The superficial inclusion of references to women in the context of addressing terrorism and advancing counterterrorism strategies should not be read as a form of meaningful intersection between the Women, Peace and Security agenda and by now wellestablished post 9/11 international security regimes. 33 Ultimately the shift to integrate the women, peace and security agenda into the counterterrorism and countering of violent extremism raises a series of concerns and questions about the role of the Security Council in developing women, peace and security. In particular, the use of violence, both through the Security Council and outside of the collective security apparatus to counter terror, whether as targeted strikes on the territory of other states or as military air strikes in the name of humanitarianism, should be of deep concern to feminist actors committed to alternative strategies for promoting security that are detached from the use of military violence.
The long history of feminist peace activism, including the work of WILPF that instigated, drafted and promoted Security Council resolution 1325 in the first place, is at odds with policy that condones and uses military force as an enforcement mechanism. The anti-military and long-time peace activism of WILPF was edited out of the original draft of Security Council resolution 1325, 34 yet the commitments of WILPF have lead the implementation strategies with respect to the resolution. 35 The project of feminist peace activism has been integral to the slow, but sure, progressions around participation across the eight resolutions.
That is, in pursuing and refining the participation components of the women, peace and security framework the potential for challenging existing decision-making processes, in the Security Council, in peace processes and in local and regional decision-making structures reflects a crucial component of feminist peace activism, where women's existing contributions and potential contributions to peace and security can be cultivated, acknowledged and expanded.
Of significant concern within international counter terrorism strategies is the continued use of drone strikes against terrorist actors. The secrecy and failures with respect to consultation with any other actors, including the Security Council, over the decision to use unmanned armed vehicles by the US and its allies, to target terrorist actors, suggests what the Security Council gives in 2242 in the name of enhanced participation of women it takes away in paragraphs 11-13 where women, peace and security becomes a tool in countering terrorism and violence extremism. The US has previously relied on the Security Council's targeted sanctions regimes against terrorist actors as justification for targeted strikes through the use of drone technology. 36 In this context, the pursuit of understanding the 'the drivers of radicalization for women' within 2242 and the need for women's organisations to assist in countering terrorism and violent extremism co-opts the women, peace and security framework into the larger countering terrorism violence of powerful states. In the subsequent Security Council resolution 2368 (20 th July 2017), on threats to international security caused by terrorist acts, the Security Council makes a singular oblique reference to the women, peace and security developments, in paragraph 15, and 'reaffirms its intention to consider targeted sanctions for individuals and entities associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida involved in trafficking in persons in areas affected by armed conflict and in sexual violence in conflict'. 37 Importantly, the entwining of the two agendas within the Council exists within the women, peace and security resolutions and not in the countering terrorism resolutions, suggesting a process of bringing counter terrorism thinking into the women, peace and security framework but not gender agendas into counter terrorism strategies.
At the same time, civil society actors working on women, peace and security that fail to comply with the countering terrorism and violent extremism risk funding and support, even when the goals of the organisation might be dislocated from terrorism as an issue. The women, peace and security gains are further minimised when the conflict related sexual violence work of the Security Council is also paired with anti-terrorism strategies as this returns to the model of protective participation and adds women as early warning signs for acts of terror while diminishing women's roles as local participants and actors with relevant stakes, gains and knowledge in any security discourse per se, not for their specific vulnerability to conflict-related sexual violence. Furthermore, the integration of the countering terrorism strategies into the women, peace and security agenda reinforces a retrograde production of gender as binary and preoccupied with saving women. The imagery of the Secretary-General's Report on conflict-related sexual violence centres on women's vulnerability in manner that directly undermines the production of participation provisions that avoid acknowledging the possibility of a position of recognising women's existing capacity to facilitate transformative political spaces and further remove the structures from identifying and seeing male privilege and men's overrepresentation in security discourse as misrepresentative and problematic in producing gender sensitive change. Instead, it seems likely that women's security initiatives, be they centred on participation, health, education, diversity or preventing gender-based violence will increasingly have to demonstrate the nexus to anti-terror projects to receive attention, funding and access in the future.
Finally, the very narrow space for understanding what constitutes terror and violent extremism under international law is lost as a space for feminist dialogue, interrogation and critique if that space is now co-opted into the women, peace and security agenda. An example, from the autonomous province of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea is illustrative.
In Bougainville, the key security issues emerge from the rising sea levels and the ownership of the Panguna mine. Notwithstanding the many years of conflict Bougainville is still recovering and rebuilding from, it is rising sea levels, which directly affect the security of homes and townships on coastal regions, and the economic and environmental impact of planned re-opening of the Panguna mine that are a direct threat to Bougainville livelihoods. It is not really possible to re-imagine either of these issues in the language of counteringterrorism, although both issues have important gendered dimensions that would benefit, in particular, from attention to the capacity for ensuring women's participation in decisionmaking. 38 As the international framework moves toward the coupling of countering terrorism 38 Heathcote, op. cit. discourses with women, peace and security initiatives, this raises important questions with regard to how Bougainville women ensure that their security initiatives and concerns are given space and meaning. For feminist scholars, strategies beyond liberal/ radical feminisms are required; so as to listen to those on the peripheries with the goal of transforming feminist thinking and action. Previously Bougainville has also suffered from its status as an autonomous province within the state of Papua New Guinea, however as Bougainville moves toward statehood/ independence (with a referendum on the matter now overdue) the capacity of the Bougainville government to provide security for its people will require focus on regional initiatives around re-location for those that are at risk of losing their homes due to rising sea levels and mechanisms to ensure economically powerful non-state actors are not able to use the mine as a source of wealth that depletes the stability of Bougainville citizens.
The gender dimensions of these two security threats are underscored by the local gender structures which place women as the primary landowners, meaning the loss of livelihoods and land through either rising sea levels or multi-national enterprise greed in accessing the mine must be agreed with women as participants in any decision-making structures.
However, gender structures within Bougainville also suffer from the legacy of international interventions: in particular the period of mandate and subsequent trusteeship status under international law. The possibilities for a nuanced understanding of gender, drawn from local perceptions, within the women, peace and security framework seems more remote than ever when terrorism, and anti-terror strategies, looks set to now dominate the next generation of resolutions on women, peace and security. Feminisms thoughtful of the complexity of diverse feminist methods might, instead, be attentive of 'how to recognise a simultaneity of different histories while not subsuming them into a commensurable spatial and temporal moment of encounter'. 39 The possibility of translating this into legal and political strategies in relation to 39 Gunaratnam and Hamilton, op cit., at 4. engagements with international institutions, such as the Security Council, would start with listening to those in post-conflict communities to understand gender and peace as mechanisms for change that are not driven by Western feminist perceptions of gender or peace.
Feminist Spaces beyond Resolution 2242
Security Council resolution 2242 undoubtedly recognises some of the existing critiques of the prior women, peace and security: pushing the framework to be responsive to women's diversity, to the need for women's participation to be a self-evident good rather than premised on protection discourse and gender perspectives to be about power structures, including recognising the Security Council itself as reproducing and producing gendered norms. The sustained feminist work, via the work of WILPF and UN Women, that produced the progressions on participation across the eight resolutions from resolution 1325 to resolution 2242 are a progress that contain all kinds of promises in terms of how international institutions can be made to take note, how 'footholds' 40 can be transformed into ledges of opportunity and how transnational feminist projects can mobilise a slow, yet unwavering, commitment to change in the most gendered of institutions. 41 However, slow progress is indicative of the small gains produced and the ledge of opportunity risks, always, being reconstructed by the institution's own agendas. 42 The emergence of the countering terrorism provisions in paragraphs 11 to 13 of resolution 2242 undertakes precisely this type of reconstructive workevidenced eight months later in the annual discussions on conflict related sexual violence in the Security Council which start with countering terrorism provisions and centre this in the CRSV discourse.
In this section I wish to propose an alternative future for resolution 2242. In this alternative future for resolution 2242 a road map for implementation centres on instrumentalising politically responsible listening to peripheral subjects, as a form of postcolonial feminism, alongside an intersectional account of power -and how power sustains itself within institutions. I argue that rather than accepting the co-optation of gender law reform or withdrawing from the spaces of global governance, continued feminist mis-readings of the resolutions, grounded in feminist methodologies, offers as alternative future for the resolutions. This taps into the legacy of Security Council resolution 1325 as produced and mobilised through the work of women's and feminist NGOs, working transnationally and across networks to render the resolution a living legal document. Notwithstanding the criticisms that have been levelled at Security Council resolution 1325, its value remains in the entrenched role it plays in activist communities. To counteract the reduction of feminist understanding that institutional texts continually favour it is crucial that attention to the mobilisation and life of resolution 2242 be centred on the non-institutional potential, to ultimately influence the institutions it speaks to. However, I would also add that it might also be time to consider abandonment of the women, peace and security framework: in favour of a feminist strategies that would be situated as questioning the Council's approach to counterterrorism, 43 rather than the furthering of the project of incorporation into the United Nations security architecture.
To consider what types of changes are required to shift to a project of politically responsible listening, 44 rather than the current liberal/ radical feminist approach of the women, peace and 43 Also see: Ní Aoláin, op. cit. 44 despite their connection to the policies and outcomes at the local level. To ask how international law and policy is received by women within conflict and post conflict communities, and how they would proceed, change and challenge those laws and policies is not only to hear peripheral subjects through her participation but also to exercise listening in line with Otto's ideas on the nexus between listening and political responsibility. In this sense, 'the importance of numerous and varied feminist ideas and feminist struggles' 50 remains central to my understanding of feminist methods that regards feminist knowledge production within peripheral spaces as important as, sometimes more important than, those that have the ear of the Security Council.
If it is to be deployed as transformative tool, Security Resolution 2242 needs to be understood as holding the potential to place those traditionally regarded as peripheral subjects and distanced from the main events of international affairs as the vital and missing voices needed for creating security strategies that are transformative from a gender perspective. For Kapur:
... it is important to recognise and center the peripheral subject and her multiple historically, culturally and socially determined subjectivities instead of falling back on universalised assumptions about women's realities and their subject position. 51 Kapur acknowledges the production of victim subjects via women's human rights strategies regional and transnational spaces. As such, the references in Security Council resolution 2122 that require the Security Council to apply a gender analysis to its own work are important tools for challenging the all too easy production of victim subjects and saving narratives in the women, peace and security framework. These approaches, at once casting women as primarily vulnerable to sexual violence in armed conflict, and thus a victim, and at the same time constructing elite women as best placed to save women in conflict communities, ignore the potential contributions to political and legal arrangements from the women who is regarded as a victim. The peripheral subject, and her understanding of the interlocking of gender and race privilege, then becomes a site of knowledge to begin feminist conversations on how to dismantle 'universal assumptions about women's realities'. 52 The quest to shift to cross-regional approaches, with greater civil society participation and appropriate funding for training is integral to this approach. Nevertheless, there is still a necessity to arrest top down processes that situate gender experts as separate to gendered victim. The peripheral subject is not engaged to be saved but rather to inform the contours of responses.
In addition, attention to the legacy of coloniality must be placed within the centre of feminist strategies. In the context of counter-terrorism the Secretary-General's remark on the thinking behind resolution 2242 underscore a continued project of us and them / civilised and uncivilised. The mobilisation of women's rights as a mechanism to bolster Western and powerful state counter terrorism strategies, which nearly always involve force and tend to replicate colonial histories of force and intervention, needs to be challenged via gender strategies rather than reinforced through them. A failure to attend to, or a failure to highlight and address, the imperial dimensions and colonial legacies played out in counter-terrorism strategies reproduces rather than reduces terrorism and violent extremism. Security Council resolution 2242 contains no reflection on the continued impact of past violence meted out on 52 Ibidem. states through the foreign policies of the five permanent members of the Security Council, however a feminist project mindful of this has the potential to be transformative for the lives of those at greatest risk in conflict communities and to disrupt the continued ruptures to transnational feminisms borne of a failure of elite women's narrow rendering of women's lives.
Finally, there is a need to address embodied subjectivity within the Security Council resolutions to acknowledge how the resolutions construct gendered bodies in times of conflict and contribute to the racialized bodies associated with anti-terrorism discourse. The antiterrorism paragraphs in Security Council resolution 2242 articulate gender as shorthand for women and with a clear articulation of good (women's organisations assisting the Security Council) and bad (women at risk of radicalisation) that is dangerously simplistic in its understanding of subjectivities and raises questions about the capacity of a warmongering institution, such as the Security Council, as the appropriate site for developing a feminist agenda. 53 Ultimately the view of terrorism within the resolutions is reminiscent of former US President George Bush's refrain: 'You are either with us or against'. 54 The good/bad binary within resolution 2242 on countering terror versus women at risk of radicalisation is already being deployed by states to demarcate some bodies as dangerous and as not belonging in powerful Western states such as the UK. 55 the perpetuation of terror and the complicity of past state practices in the rise of specific terrorist groups.
Security Council resolution 2242 is an important, perhaps the most important, Security
Council resolution on women, peace and security. However, Resolution 2242 also chimes louder than the seven previous resolutions with regard to the risks of engagement with an institution with a mandate to authorise the use of force and highlights unequivocally how the agenda of the Council dictates the contours of the women, peace and security framework. A feminist approach to security, in contrast, has a legacy of anti-militarisation and listening to peripheral subjects that might be drawn on to produce a project of peace, and constructive misreadings and re-orientating of the women, peace and security framework rather than the current divisive and destructive model.
